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Baker: Ogburn-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners: Procedural Due Process And

OGB URN-MA TTHEWS V. LOBLOLLYPARTNERS:
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND AN
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO AN ADJUDICATORY
HEARING

I.

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental purposes of due process are to ensure the individual a
timely and meaningful opportunity to be heard and to provide her access to
judicial review. These are separate and distinct requirements. As aresult, when
a person has an interest in life, liberty or property that is directly affected by the
decision of an administrative agency, that person generally has a right not only
to judicial review of the agency's decision, but also to an opportunity to be
heardby the agency itselfprior to judicial review. Debate continues about what
the opportunity to be heard entails in cases involving South Carolina agencies.
2 the South Carolina
In a recent case, Ogburn-Matthewsv. Loblolly Partners,
Court of Appeals held that (1) due process does not entitle a person whose land
adjoins a wetland to have an agency affirmatively respond to an objection that
the filling of the wetland was inconsistent with the state's Coastal Zone
Management Plan; and (2) due process does not entitle that landowner to a
trial-type hearing in which she could cross-examine witnesses In addition, the
court also discussed the applicability of the "contested case" provision of the
South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA)4 to adjudications in

which due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard, but no state
statute or regulation requires a hearing.' This Note analyzes the court's
decision in Ogburn-Matthews,its implications on noncontested-case decisions,
and its effect, if any, on the procedural safeguards required to satisfy due

1.The United States Constitution provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 1. South Carolina has adopted a similar provision in its Constitution that states:
"The privileges and immunities of citizens of this State and of the United States under this
Constitution shall not be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law ... ." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3. In general, these provisions provide
certain rights for individuals affected by government actions. Such rights are referred to as "due
process rights" and include those "rights (as to life, liberty, and property) so fundamentally
important as to require compliance with due-process standards offairness and justice." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIoNARY 517 (7th ed. 1999).
2. 332 S.C. 551, 505 S.E.2d 598 (CL App. 1998).
3. Id. at 562-63, 569, 505 S.E.2d at 604, 607.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(3) (West Supp. 1999) (previously §1-23-310(2)).
5. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 570-71, 505 S.E.2d at 607-08.
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process in administrative proceedings.
Part II of this Note provides background information and summarizes the
facts, reasoning, and holding in the Ogburn-Matthewscase. This section also
summarizes prior South Carolina cases dealing with program certifications and
issues similar to those raised in the Ogburn-Matthewscase and the relationship
of these cases to Ogburn-Matthews. Part II also provides background on the
evolution of the three-factor test in Mathews v. Eldridge for determining what
procedural safeguards are necessary to satisfy due process. The OgburnMatthews court employed the three-factor test in rendering part of its decision.
Part m analyzes the court's use of the Eldridge test and its bearing on the facts
in Ogburn-Matthews. Part IV discusses whether any basis exists for the
argument that a hearing required by law, in the absence of a statutory
requirement, would trigger the contested-case provision requiring formal
adjudication.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ogburn-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners6
Ogburn-Matthews involves the State's side of a complicated regulatory
scheme for issuing consistency certifications, which allow developers to obtain
permits to proceed with the development of property within South Carolina's
coastal zone area. The program is based on cooperative federalism.' Thus, the
certification and permitting process is the result of a corroboration between
state and federal agencies.' In order to understand how the state agency's
decision affected the private interest involved in Ogburn-Matthews, it is
important to comprehend how the program operates.
In Ogburn-Matthews,a developer applied for a Nationwide 26 permit? to
6. 332 S.C. 551,505 S.E.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1998).
7. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20(C) (West Supp. 1999).

8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80(b)(7) describes the State's role in the federal permitting
process. The State's obligations are as follows:
In devising the management program the department shall
consider all lands and waters in the coastal zone for planning
purposes. In addition, the department shall:
(7) Provide for consideration of whether a proposed activity of
an applicant for a federal license or permit complies with the
State's coastal zone program and for the issuance of notice to
any concerned federal agency as to whether the State concurs
with or objects to the proposed activity.
9. Nationwide permits (NWP) are described as:
[A] type of general permit issued by the Chief ofEngineers and
are designed to regulate with littl., if any, delay or paperwork
certain activities having minimal impacts. The NWPs are
proposed, issued, modified, reissued (extended), and revoked
from time to time after an opportunity for public notice and
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/3
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fill a wetland 0 next to Ogbum-Matthews's property." Nationwide 26 is a

federal regulatory program that issues permits for a variety of federal activities
impacting the environment. 2 South Carolina's Coastal Zone Management
Program was likewise adopted to establish state policy on such environmental
impacts within the State's coastal zone areas. 3 The Nationwide 26 permit is
issued by the federal government. 4 Under the Nationwide 26 permit program,
the petitioner receives a consistency certification from the South Carolina
Environmental Control Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management
(Agency) certifying that the proposed activity is consistent with South
Carolina's coastal environmental policies. 5 The authority to issue consistency

comment. Proposed NWPs or modifications to or reissuance of
existing NWPs will be adopted only after the Corps gives notice
and allows the public an opportunity to comment on and request
a public hearing regarding the proposals. The Corps will give
full consideration to all comments received prior to reaching a
final decision. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b) (1999).
10. Ogburn-Matthews, 332 S.C. at 558, 505 S.E.2d at 601. Wetlands are areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs,
and similar areas. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1999).
11. Id. at 555, 505 S.E.2d at 600.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 557, 505 S.E.2d at 601.
14.Id. at 556, 505 S.E.2d at 600; see Nationwide Permit Program, 33 C.F.R. § 330 (1999).
In South Carolina, Nationwide 26 permits are issued through the Department of the Army,
Charleston District Corps of Engineers. Id.
15. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 557-58, 505 S.E.2d at 601. S.C. CODEANN. § 48-39-80
(West Supp. 1999) provides:
The department shall develop a comprehensive coastal
management program, and thereafter have the responsibility for
enforcing and administering the program in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter and any rules and regulations
promulgated under this chapter. In developing the program the
department shall:
(A) Provide a regulatory system which the department shall use
in providing for the orderly and beneficial use of the critical
areas.
(B) In devising the management program the department shall
consider all lands and waters in the coastal zone for planning
purposes ....
(C) Provide for a review process of the management program
and alterations that involve interested citizens as well as local,
regional, state and federal agencies.
(D) Consider the planning and review of existing water quality
standards and classifications in the coastal zone.
(E) Provide consideration for nature related uses of critical
areas, such as aquaculture, mariculture, waterfowl and wading
bird management, game and nongame habitatprotection projects
and endangered flora and fauna.
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certifications lies with the Agency. 6 In the event the Agency fails to act on a
permitee's request within six months, its concurrence is presumed by the Corps
and the permit will be issued." If the Agency decides to reject a request for
certification, the Corps may still issue a Nationwide 26 permit if 'the activity
is consistent with the objectives of [the federal Coastal Zone Management Act]
or is otherwise necessary in the interest ofnational security.""... Thus, a request
for certification of consistency with the State Coastal Zone Management
Program is merely a preliminary step in the Nationwide 26 permitting process
and may not control whether a Nationwide 26 permit will ultimately be issued.
When a request for certification is submitted to the Agency, its staff must
evaluate the project to determine consistency with the State's Coastal Zone
Management program. If Agency staff determine the project is consistent with
the program, they must then issue a public notice of the proposed certification
and review any objections to the certification.' Decisions by Agency staff to
issue a certification despite objections are also subject to review by the Coastal
Council pursuant to procedures adopted in the Program refinements of 1993.20
These refinements stipulate that (1) agency staff decisions are deemed final
agency decisions unless three Council members21 make a written request to
hear oral arguments before the full Council; and (2) upon such written demand,
oral arguments will be heard after the ten-day comment period. The order of the
Council, whether affirming, reversing, or modifying the staff decision, shall be
the final agency action in the matter.2
Loblolly submittedplans to fill the wetland next to the Ogburn-Matthews's
property.2 Loblolly's first attempts to obtain a certification ofconsistency from
the Agency were unsuccessful. The Agency's staff environmental reviews
failed to conclude that Loblolly's activity would meet the criteria of the state's
coastal environmental policies.24 However, based on a third environmental
review conducted by an Agency biologist, the Agency issued a "Notice of
Intent" to certify that filling the wetland was consistent with the Agency's

16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80 (West Supp. 1999).
17. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 556, 505 S.E.2d. at 600; 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(d)(6) (1999).
18. Ogburn-Matthews, 332 S.C. at 557, 505 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c)(3)(A) 1985 & Supp. 1997)) (brackets in original).
19. Id. at 557, 505 S.E.2d at 601.
20. Id.
21. The Council serves as an advisory council to the South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control. The full Council is composed ofa total offourteen members, chosen
from the following: eight (8) members, one from each coastal zone county and another six (6)
members, one from each state Congressional district. As of 1994, the South Carolina Coastal
Council became the South Carolina Coastal Zone Appellate Panel. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-3940(A) & (C) (West Supp. 1999).
22. Ogburn-Matthews, 332 S.C. at 557-58, 505 S.E.2d at 601 (citing 1993 Coastal Zone
Management Program Final Refinements p. 20).
23. Id. at 558, 505 S.E.2d at 601.
24. Id. at 558-59, 505 S.E.2d at 601-02.
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program.' Upon receipt of this notice, Ogbum-Matthews submitted a written
objection to the Agency's issuance of the certificate of consistency.26
As previously mentioned, the Agency's certification procedures require
27
that all consistency certification objections be reviewed by the Agency.
Unless three members ofthe full Council request in writing that oral arguments
be held before them, the decision to issue the certification will be deemed a
final agency decision by default.2 8 Because no request for oral argument was
ever made, the staff recommendation to issue Loblolly's request for
certification of consistency became a final agency action, and the certificate
was issued without any further notice to Ogbum-Matthews.2 9
Consequently, Ogburn-Matthews filed a complaint requesting that the
circuit court review the Agency's decision either under South Carolina's
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) or, in the alternative, upon a writ of
certiorari. ° She complained that the Agency's procedures in issuing the
certification denied her due process of law.3 ' First, she complained that the
review process had no procedure to notify her that the Agency had received her
objections.32 Second, she contended he review process did not ensure that
Agency staff or the Council had considered her objections before issuing the
consistency certification.33 Upon review, the special referee concluded that the
Agency's review procedures "complied with the minimum34 standards of due
process and the Agency had applied its policies correctly.,
In a unanimous decision, the South Carolina Court ofAppeals agreed that
the Agency's procedures satisfied the minimum standards of due process. 5 The
court rejected Ogbum-Matthews's contentions that due process required that
she be afforded an affirmative response or action from the Agency pursuant to
her objection.3 6 The court identified two problems with Ogbum-Matthews's
contentions. First, Ogbum-Matthews failed to show that the Council did not
perform its fimction. 7 Second, because she failed to identify "any fundamental
right at stake which can only be protected by imposing an additional procedure
to verify that a contestant's arguments have actually been reviewed and
considered," she could not establish substantial prejudice resulting from the

25. Id. at 559, 505 S.E.2d at 601-02.
26. Id. at 559, 505 S.E.2d at 602.
27. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
28. See supratext accompanying note 17.
29. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 559, 505 S.E.2d at 602.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 559-60, 505 S.E.2d at 602.
33. Id. at 561, S.E.2d at 603.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 563, 505 S.E.2d at 604.
36. Id. at 563, 505 S.E.2d at 604.
37,Id. at 562-63, 505 S.E.2d at 603-04

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51: 699

Agency's procedures." Accordingly, the court concluded that no trial-type
hearing or other procedure requiring some sort of response by the Agency was
necessary to satisfy due process in the consistency certification scheme.39
In addition to the due process argument, Ogbum-Matthews argued that
consistency certifications are governed by the APA.' She contended that the
APA requires that certification decisions be supported by "substantial
evidence" and that the certification at issue was not so supported.4" Further, if
the APA governs consistency certifications, that statute mandates an
adjudicatory hearing be held in all contested cases.4' On the other hand, if the
APA does not apply, the Agency action could still be reviewed on a writ of
certiorari, but such review would be governed by an "any evidence" standard,
an easier burden for the Agency to meet. The court discussed the applicability
of the APA without resolving the issue,43 explaining that the Agency's decision
failed the "any evidence" standard of review." Accordingly, the court reversed
the lower court's ruling.4"
B. Due Processand Consistency Certificationsin South Carolina
Ogburn-Matthews is not the first case in South Carolina to hold that due
process does not entitle an individual to a trial-type hearing for challenges to
a certification issued by a state agency. Three cases decided before OgburnMatthews dealt with certifications issued pursuant to environmental permitting
programs." Although these cases hold that challenges to certifications are not
contested cases, they do establish the existence of aright to due process distinct
from the procedural rights available in contested cases under the APA.47

38. Id. ("[T]he failure to implement a procedure requiring affirmative action by the council
to finalize the Agency's decision does not offend due process, absent a showing of substantial
prejudice.").
39. Id. at 563-69, 505 S.E.2d at 604-07.
40. Id. at 570, 505 S.E.2d at 607.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43.Id.at 571, 505 S.E.2d at 608.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 571-75,505 S.E.2d at 608-10. The Agency must determine that a proposed project
is consistent with the policies of the Coastal Zone Management Program. The policies apply to
isolated wetlands only. Therefore, if the wetland does not meet the criteria of an "isolated
wetland" the program's policies are inapplicable. The Agency's final review merely stated that
the wetland was isolated and gave no factual explanation for this statement. Id. at 572, 505
S.E.2d at 608-09.
46. See League of Women Voters v. Litchfield-by-the-Sea, 305 S.C. 424,409 S.E.2d 378
(1991); Stono River Envtl. Protection Ass'n v. South Carolina Dep't ofHealth & Envtl. Control,
305 S.C. 90,406 S.E.2d 340 (1991); Triska v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 292 S.C. 190,
355 S.E.2d 531 (1987).
47. See League of Women Voters, 305 S.C. at 426-27, 409 S.E.2d at 380 (holding that
despite the fact that DHEC's action was not a contested case, article I, section 22 of the South
Carolina Constitution imposes a separate requirement for notice and opportunity to be heard
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Further, the cases establish that this right to due process is available to
individuals claiming certain kinds of interests in the environment, even when
the claim does not constitute a contested case.4s
The South Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the issue in Triska v.
Department of Health and Environmental Control.49 Triska involved a
challenge to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control's (DHEC) authority to revoke a 401 Certification that it had previously
issued.50 After issuing the certification, DHEC suspended the certification to
conduct an internal review.5' After further investigation, DHEC decided that
no further review was necessary and reinstated the certification. 2 DHEC
granted a local citizens group's request foran adjudicatory hearing to challenge
D-EC's reinstatement of the 401 certification. 3 The South Carolina Supreme
Court held that DHEC lacked the authority to revoke the 401 certification, as4
401 Certifications are not contested cases as defined by DHEC regulations.Therefore, DHEC had no authority to grant an adjudicatory hearing to the
citizens' group.55
The court addressed this issue again in Stono River Environmental
ProtectionAss 'n. v. South CarolinaDepartmentofHealth & Environmental
ControL 6 In Stono River the court addressed whether DHEC denied Stono
River an opportunity to contest the issuance of a 401 Certification in an
adjudicatory proceeding.57 Affirming its ruling in Triska that 401 Certifications
are not contested cases as defined by the APA, the court stated "the key
consideration in determining whether a case is 'contested' is whether 'the legal
rights, duties or privileges of a party are requiredby law to be determined by
an agency after an opportunityfor a hearing."'' Because no state or federal
statute required an adjudicatory hearing on certification determinations, the
proceeding leading to that determination was not a contested case.5 9 However,

outside of the APA).
48. See Rowe v. City of West Columbia, 334 S.C. 400,407,513 S.E.2d 379,382-03 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Ross v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, 328 S.C. 51, 68,492 S.E.2d
62, 71 (1997)). "We have interpreted [article I, section 22 of the South Carolina Constitution]
as specifically guaranteeing persons the right to notice and opportunity to be heard by an
administrative agency, even when a contested case under the APA is not involved." Id. (citation
omitted) (brackets in original).
49. 292 S.C. 190, 355 S.E.2d 531 (1987).
50. Id. at 192, 355 S.E.2d at 532.
51. Id. at 193, 355 S.E.2d at 532-33.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 193, 355 S.E.2d at 533.
54. Id. at 196-97, 355 S.E.2d at 534-35.
55. Id. at 197, 355 S.E.2d at 535.
56. 305 S.C. 90, 406 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
57. Id. at 92, 406 S.E.2d at 341.
58. Id. at 93, 406 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting S.C. CoDEANN. § 1-23-310(3) (West Supp. 1999)
(previously §1-23-310(2)).
59. Hearing procedures are now mandated in 401 certification cases pursuant to regulations
adopted by the General Assembly. See 25A S.C. CODE ANN. RGS. 61-101 (West Supp. 1999).
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the court added that although an adjudicatory hearing was not required by
statute, "[a]dministrative agencies are required to meet minimum standards of
due process."' The court observed that these standards are flexible and should
be fashioned to meet the demands of the particular situation.6'
In League of Women Voters v. Litchfield-by-the-Sea,62 the court addressed
whether certifications of consistency for state-issued permits under the
Agency's Coastal Zone Management Program can be challenged in an
adjudicatory hearing pursuant to the APA. 6' Relying on the rulings in Stono
River and Triska, the court again held that consistency certifications issued by
the Council are not contested cases subject to review under the APA. 6
Therefore, no requirement for an adjudicatory hearing exists.65 However, the
court also stated the following regarding the requirements of due process:
We are cognizant of the fact that Council's certification
determination is not binding upon DHEC, the permitting
agency. However, we are constrained to safeguard the
interests of the parties at all stages of the application process
since Council's certification determination may be accorded
significant weight by the permitting agency in deciding
whether or not to grant a permit. Hence Council, as an
administrative agency, must comport with standards of due
process established by Article I, Section 22, of the South

Carolina Constitution.66

The development of the law in these cases suggests that, even when a
property owner does not have a right to a contested case hearing under the
APA, the owner may be entitled to additional procedural safeguards in order
to satisfy the minimum standards of due process required by the South Carolina
Constitution and the United States Constitution. 67 These cases stop short,
however, of delineating exactly what those safeguards are in state agency
decisions regarding noncontested cases. Further, the Ogburn-Matthews court
noted that no South Carolina case has squarely decided whether the contestedcase provisions of the APA are triggered when an opportunity to be heard by

60. Stono River EnvtI. ProtectionAss'n, 305 S.C. at 93-94, 406 S.E.2d at 342 (citations
omitted).
61. Id.; see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) ("Due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
62. 305 S.C. 424, 409 S.E.2d 378 (1991).
63. Id. at 425-26, 409 S.E.2d at 379-80.
64. Id. at 426, 409 S.E.2d at 380.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 427, 409 S.E.2d at 380.
67. See supranotes 1,46-48 and accompanying text.
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the agency is required by due process."
The APA defines a contested case as one in which private rights "are
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for
hearing."69 The unanswered question is whether this definition is satisfied when
due process requires an agency to afford a contestant an opportunity to be
heard; is due process a "law" for purposes of this definition? Although South
Carolina has not answered this question, the United States Supreme Court has
established precedent that may bear upon how an answer to this question could
be framed. Thus the next Section provides a discussion of this case law.
C. What Processis Due: The Evolution andApplication of the Eldridge
Test
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law...." 7o The South Carolina Constitution provides the same due
process protection to its citizens. 7' One of the fundamental premises behind due
process is that persons are given an opportunity to be heard and that such
opportunity "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."'72 Exactly what form or type of procedure is required to afford an
individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard has been debated in the courts
for years, and, as Ogburn-Matthews demonstrates, the question continues to
pervade the courts today.
In addition to an opportunity to be heard, the individual is entitled to
judicial review of decisions affecting their rights.73 The general rule is that,
when a vested prop erty right or constitutional right of an individual is adversely
affected by a governmental decision, judicial review is required as a matter of

68. Ogburn-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners, 332 S.C. 551, 571, 505 S.E.2d 598, 608 (Ct.
App. 1998).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(3) (West Supp. 1999).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
72. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
73. Ogbum-Matthews sought review of her case either as a contested case under the APA
or upon a writ of certiorari. Ifjudicial review is constitutionally mandated, a writ of certiorari
may be the only avenue to provide for such review. See Rowe v. City of West Columbia, 334
S.C. 400,407,513 S.E.2d 379,382 (CL App.1999).
No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial
decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights
except on due notice and opportunity to be heard; ... nor shall
he be deprived of liberty or property unless by a mode of
procedure prescribed by the General Assembly, and he shall
have in all such instances the right to judicial review.
S.C. CONsT. art I,

§ 22.
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due process. 74 This is so even when there is a statutory provision that appears
to preclude review: "Such a provision does not affect the right 'to an
administrative proceeding uncontaminated by a violation of the
Constitution.' 75 Thus, where the right to an adjudicatory hearing is not
provided by statute, the protections of due process are embodied in the
Constitution and its principles of "fundamental fairness
which may require that
76
an opportunity for a hearing be provided ....
Although the concepts of fundamental fairness and due process require
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the requirement that this procedure be
in the form of an adjudicatory hearing is not mandated. In Walters v. National
Ass 'n of Radiation Survivors,77 the United States Supreme Court adhered to
precedent establishing that due process is a flexible concept.78 The Court stated:
"In defining the process necessary to ensure 'fundamental fairness' we have
recognized that the [Due Process Clause] does not require that 'the procedures
used to guard against an erroneous deprivation... be so comprehensive as to
preclude any possibility of error. . . ."79 A review of prior rulings by the
Supreme Court will provide insight as to how this theory of "flexible due
process" developed, and what it means in terms of an opportunity for hearing
and judicial review.
In Goldbergv. Kelly80 the Court decided whether the termination of public
assistance payments to a recipient without first affording her the opportunity
for an evidentiary hearing denied the recipient due process of law.8 Holding
that such hearings are necessary to satisfy due process, the Court based its
decision on two factors: the nature of the governmental function involved and
74. See Bernard Schwartz,AdministrativeLawCasesDuring1996,49 ADMIN.L. REV. 519,
536-37 (1997) (quoting Justice Brandeis: "The supremacy of law demands that there shall be
opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly." St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
75. Id. at 537 (citing Czerkies v. Dep't of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir. 1996)).
76.2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 294 (1994). Section 294 states, in part:
[I]f no such right is granted by statute or ordinance or
administrative regulation, the right [to a hearing] is embodied in
due process and the principles of fundamental fairness which
may require that an opportunity for a hearing be provided ....
The administrative procedure acts do not create a substantive
right to a hearing; they merely delineate the procedure to be
followed when a hearing is required by statute or constitutional
law.
Id.; see also League of Women Voters v. Litchfield-by-the-Sea, 305 S.C. 424, 426-27, 409
S.E.2d 378, 380 (1991) (restating the court's holding in Stono River that "superseding
constitutional provisions confer the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to
issuance of certification").
77.473 U.S. 305 (1985).
78. Id. at 320.
79. Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)).
80. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
81.Id. at 255.
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the individual interest affected by the government's action.82 In light of these
factors, the Court stated: "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard." 3 In this context,
the Court also expressed its view that a written submission is inadequate
because it is inflexible and does not allow the individual to conform her
argument to the thoughts of the decisionmaker.M
The Court expanded the concept of "what process is due" in Morrissey v.
Brewer. 5 In Morrissey the Court determined whether due process requires a
state to give an individual an opportunity to be heard before revoking parole. 6
Although the Court held that minimum standards of due process did require an
inquiry into the nature of a hearing, the Court qualified this requirement by
noting that such hearings are not mandated to satisfy due process.8 7 The Court
stated:
To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not
mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all
relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been
determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that
not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure.8
This appears to be a slight variation of the rule expressed in Goldberg that
suggested that evidentiary hearings are required to satisfy due process.
However, the issue of how to determine what procedural safeguards are
necessary to meet the minimum standards of due process remained unanswered
until the Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge."9
InMathews v. Eldridgethe Supreme Court held that an evidentiary hearing
is not required before terminating disability payments if agency procedures
provide an effective means for the claimant to be heard before termination.9"
Rejecting the standard established in Goldbergthat such hearings are required
before welfare benefits could be terminated, the Court stated that: "'[d]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.' Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the
administrative procedures provided.., are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected." 9 The

82. Id. at 262-263.
83. Id. at 268-269.
84. Id. at 269.
85. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
86. Id. at 472.
87. Id. at 48 1.
88.Id.
89. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
90. Id. at 349.
91. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481).
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Court set forth three factors to be weighed in the analysis: (1) the nature of the
private interest that will be affected by the administrative action; (2) the risk
that an erroneous deprivation ofthe interest may occur through the procedures
in place and the value, if any, of implementing an additional procedural
safeguard; and (3) the government's interest, fiscally and functionally, in the
degree of burden involved in implementing an additional or substitute
procedural safeguard. 92
In addition to these three factors, the Court emphasized that more is
involved than simply weighing "fiscal and administrative burdens against the
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a
determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type
procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness."93
Thus, the Court's test must be viewed with respect to the basic principle of due
process, to wit, a person should not suffer a loss without being given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and present her case.94
III. ANALYSIS
In resolving the issue of whether due process entitled Ogbum-Matthews
to a trial-type hearing in which she could confront and cross-examine
witnesses, the court employed the three-factor test established in Mathews v.
Eldridge.9' The test is a balancing-type analysis; it weighs the private interest
at stake and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest against the
governmental interest involved.96
A. FiscalBurden Analysis
In concluding that due process did not require a trial-type hearing, the
Ogburn-Matthews court relied on the fact that (1) there was no fundamental
right at stake that could only be protected by an additional safeguard, and (2)
Ogbum-Matthews presented no evidence that there was an error in procedure

92. Id. at 334-35.
93. Id. at 348.
94. Id. at 348-349.

95. This test states:
[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation ofsuch interestthrough theprocedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
96. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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or that the Council did not perform its function." Balancing the private interest
at stake in Ogburn-Matthewsagainst the burden that would be placed on the
government in implementing an additional procedural safeguard in the
consistency certification program, the court held that the Agency's procedures
met minimum due process standards.98 The court reasoned that, because
Ogburn-Matthews failed to establish some type of economic interest that would

99
be adversely affected by the issuance of the consistency certification, the

governmental interest "weigh[ed] against requiring a more formal, adversarial
hearing."' 00 In essence, her individual interest was not great enough to
outweigh the cost of providing a formal hearing. In support of its conclusion,
the court stated that, because the Agency's action of certification was less
critical than the actual issuing of the permit, along with the fact that
approximately two thousand consistency reviews are conducted a year,
instituting a formalized hearing in the review process would significantly
increase the administrative burden on the agency.'10
Of the reasons stated by the court for denying the need for a trial-type
hearing, the most compelling one is the increased burden placed on the Agency
by requiring such hearings. The basis for the court's reasoning is analogous to
the one stated in Mathews v. Eldridge regarding the burden placed on the
government by requiring evidentiary hearings before terminating disability
benefits. Discussing the increment in cost resulting from the increased number
of hearings, the Court stated:
Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining
whether due process requires a particular procedural
safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But the
Government's interest, and hence that of the public, in
conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a
factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an
additional safeguard to the individual affected by the
administrative action and to society in terms of increased
assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the
cost. 0 2
As in Mathews v. Eldridge,imposing an evidentiary hearing requirement upon
demand in all consistency certifications would entail substantial fiscal and
administrative burdens on the Agency. Although the court in Ogburn-Matthews

97. Ogbum-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners, 332 S.C. 551,561-69,505 S.E.2d 598,603-07
(1998).
98. Id. at 569, 505 S.E.2d at 607.
99. Id. at 565, 505 S.E.2d at 605.
100. Id. at 568, 505 S.E.2d at 606.
101. Id. at 568-69, 505 S.E.2d at 607.
102. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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could not state with certainty the number of hearings that would be requested,
it concluded "with little fear of contradiction... that the formalization of the
review process to include an adversarial hearing [would result in] a
significantly increased administrative burden."' 3
B. PrivateInterestAnalysis
In applying the three-factor test of Mathews v. Eldridge, the OgburnMatthews court held that the first two factors weighed against requiring a trialtype hearing.' While the court found that the private interest-OgbumMatthews's loss of use and enjoyment of the wetland-was sufficient to
provide standing, the fact that Ogbum-Matthews had no possessory rights or
economic interest in the property lessened the potential that she would suffer
an individual deprivation, as she would if she had actually owned the affected
property. 5 The risk of erroneous deprivation was mitigated by the fact that the
Agency's certification process is technical in nature. 6 Because of that
characteristic the court concluded that little would be gained by crossexamining the biologist and surveyors who made the certification decisions.0 7
The court did indicate, however, that if Ogbum-Matthews had actually owned
the property, she may have been entitled to some further procedural safeguard
to protect her interest.108
The court's valuation of the interest at stake in Ogburn-Matthewsdeserves
further consideration. Recently, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
EnvironmentalServices (TOC), Inc., °9 the United States Supreme Court held
that citizen-suit plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury in fact by averring loss of
enjoyment, aesthetic value and a reduction in value of their nearby property
because of Laidlaw's pollution of a nearby river."oThus, Friendsofthe Earth
suggests that had Ogbum-Matthews asserted similar injuries, specifically loss
in economic and aesthetic value to her adjoining property, the court's decision
regarding Ogbum-Matthews may have been different. Historically the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that loss of intangible property interests,
such as aesthetic value and use and enjoyment, are sufficient to prove injury in
fact for Article III standing."' In addition to the types of intangible private
103. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 569, 505 S.E.2d at 607.
104. Id. at 565-68, 505 S.E.2d at 605-06.
105. Id. at 565, 505 S.E.2d at 605.
106. Id. at 567, 505 S.E.2d at 606.

107. Id. at 566-68, 505 S.E.2d at 606.

108. See id.
109. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
110. Id. at 705; but cf Smiley v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, No. 99A.J-07-0422-CC (2000) (distinguishingFriends ofthe Earth, and holding that person who used,
but did not own, land affected by agency decision lacked standing to seek judicial review under
statute authorizing review of agency decisions).
I11. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
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interests discussed in the Supreme Court cases, the individuals in Stono River,
League of Women Voters, and Ogburn-Matthews could quite possibly have
alleged tangible economic loss. For example, Ogburn-Matthews could have
alleged that filling the wetland would cause a depreciation in value of her
property. Clearly, substantial economic loss would warrant greater procedural
protection than written submissions to the deciding agency because the private
interest at stake is greater.
C. Affirmative Response Analysis Under the Mathews Test
In Ogburn-Matthews the South Carolina Court of Appeals used the
Eldridge test to determine whether the process due meant that a trial-type
hearing should be afforded to a contestant objecting to a consistency
certification."1 2 The court did not, however, discuss whether Ogbum-Matthews
was entitled to some kind of affirmative response by the Council to her
objections. The balance between the private interest and governmental interest
in this circumstance should weigh on the side of the individual. Although the
Eldridgetest may not mandate a trial-type hearing to satisfy due process as the
court concluded, the court's failure to use the test to determine whether some
other process was required is shortsighted and unexplained. Because it is
questionable whether the Council's review process actually affords the objector
the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, the utility of an affirmative
response by the Council is apparent.
As the review process stands, the only avenue for an opportunity to be
heard is for the objector to blindly rely on the agency to adhere to its
procedures when evaluating her objection. However, this type of procedural
check on government action may be inadequate." 3 Had the Council responded
to her objection, the need for judicial review could have been entirely avoided.
As discussed in an article by Robert Rabin, three values are fundamental
to due process: (1) the interest in obtaining a rational result; (2) accountability
to ensure that decisions are being made impartially; and (3) the assurance of an
adequate explanation for the basis of the agency's action."' Of particular
relevance to the Ogburn-Matthews case is the third value. The Council's
procedures for affording individuals notice and an opportunity to be heard do
not require any type of affirmative action or response on behalf of the
Agency.' ' Thus, the claimant has no way of knowing whether the Agency has
received and reviewed the objection, nor any means to evaluate whether the
Agency reached a rational result. Such procedures hardly comport with the

112. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 563-69, 505 S.E.2d at 604-07.
113. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fundamental Values
andProceduralSafeguardsin ConstitutionalRightto HearingCases, 16 SAN DIEGO L.RE V.301

(1979).
114. Id. at 302-03.
115. See Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 561, 505 S.E.2d at 603-04.
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requirement that procedures be designed to afford individuals a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. The objector is notified of the Agency's decision when
the consistency certification is issued. And it is plausible that pursuant to the
procedures in place, a written objection could be overlooked and the
certification issued by default.
Equally troubling is the fact that Ogbum-Matthews was given no
explanation concerning the basis of the Agency's decision in response to her
objection." 6 Given the Agency's procedures, it is unlikely that she had the
ability to determine whether the Agency properly performed its function.
[W]hen an important determination of individual rights is
being made by the government, a citizen ... has a critical
interest in having his status taken seriously. An indispensable
element in demonstrating that the state in fact has taken
account of the individual's claim to relief-irrespective of
whether it has merit-is an adequate explanation of the
agency's decision." 7
Requiring an explanation for the issuance of the certification would also
promote accountability. Accountability, Rabin's second stated interest, would
assure that there is a factual basis for the Agency's action and lessen the need
forjudicial review. Accountability also increases the likelihood of an impartial
result. Further, by supporting its decision with a factual explanation, the
Council not only assures the objector that it reached a rational result, but also
serves a kind of"check andbalance" on those making these decisions. OgburnMatthews is a clear illustration of the need for such an additional procedure in
the Council's review process because the certification was issued without
sufficient evidence to support it. The utility of an affirmative response is
apparent if it illuminates errors regarding consistency certifications before they
reach the level of review attained in the Ogburn-Matthewscase.
IV. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
CONTESTED-CASE PROVISION

In addition to its due process holdings, the Ogburn-Matthews court
discusses, without deciding, an important question concerning the South
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act: If due process requires an opportunity
to be heard in a case before an agency, would this due process requirement
trigger the contested-case provisions of the APA? No South Carolina case has
resolved this issue.

116. See id.at 559-61,505 S.E.2d at 602-03. After reviewing the objection, the certification
was issued by default without any further notification to Ogbum-Matthews. Id. at 559-61, 505
S.E.2d at 602.
117. Rabin, supranote 113, at 303.
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The issue arises from the APA provision defining a contested case. Under
the APA, the term "contested-case" is defined as "a proceeding including, but
not restricted to, ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by
an agency after an opportunity for hearing."" s The question is whether the
definition of a contested case is met when the law of due process, rooted in the
United States and South Carolina Constitutions, requires an opportunity to be
heard.
This issue is important because it determines whether the opportunity to be
heard guaranteed by due process must, in every case involving an agency
covered by the APA, take the form of the trial-type proceeding required under
the APA's contested-case provisions. Thus, when an administrative action
involves an important legal interest, and federal and state constitutional
standards of due process require an opportunity to be heard before any legal
rights affecting that interest are decided, it appears that a hearing would be
required by law. Conceivably, the contested-case provision of the South
Carolina APA would then be triggered, requiring a formal hearing comporting
with its procedures.
Conceivably, it is possible to read the definition of contested case as being
triggered when constitutional due process rights mandate an opportunity to be
heard. The contested-case provision defines a contested case as one in which
the law requires -an opportunity for a hearing." 9 Thus, the relevant inquiry
becomes: Does the term "law" as used in a statute encompass constitutional
requirements? The determination of whether this definition is triggered centers
on the meaning accorded to "law" and "opportunity to be heard." In a general
sense, the term law is defined to mean "[t]hat which is laid down, ordained, or
established. A rule or method according to which phenomena or actions coexist or follow each other. Law ...is a body of rules" of action or conduct
prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force.' 2 0 From
this general definition, the term law is much broader than just statutes and
regulations. Certainly it encompasses rights established under the authority of
the Constitution. The Constitution is the most fundamental source of law and
indeed a source of the highest magnitude.' It is the foundation for various
rights and principles, many of which are derived from the common law.
However, "[t]he common-law lineage of these rights does not mean they are
defeasible by statute or remain mere common-law rights.... They are, rather,
constitutional rights, and form the fundamental law of the land."" It is
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(3) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1990).
121. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("Certainly all those who
have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming thefundamentalandparamount
law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of
the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.") (emphasis added).
122. Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2256 (1999) (emphasis added).
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plausible, then, that the term "law" as used in the contested-case definition
includes fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to a hearing. If
such a right, being derived from the common law, cannot be abrogated by
statute then a fortiori, the existence of that right is not dependent upon the
statute giving it effect.
The phrase "an opportunity for hearing" is equally ambiguous. Narrowly
read, this hearing right could mean the traditional notion of an in-person
hearing before a judicial officer, similar to a trial. In this case, the APA would
not be triggered if in a particular circumstance due process required only
written submissions. However, equally plausible is that opportunity for hearing
be read broadly, so as to be synonymous to any opportunity to be heard,
including situations in which due process entitles one only to a "paper" hearing.
Thus, every case involving individual rights, legal rights and privileges to be
determined by an agency and requiring an opportunity for hearing would
trigger the APA.
In Ogburn-Matthews the court recognized earlier cases indicating that
parties may have constitutional rights requiring notice and opportunity to be
heard before issuance of certifications, but the court does not interpret these
rulings to compel the sort of notice and hearing prescribed by the APA
contested case provisions." The Ogburn-Matthewscourt noted that, in League
of Women Voters, "[it was held] that a consistency determination was not a
'contested-case' because there was no requirement imposed by statute or
regulation for a hearing,but nevertheless, the court required an opportunityto
be heardtocomply with due process."' 24 The Ogburn-Matthewscourt thus read
League of Women Voters to imply that the law in the APA's contested case
definition encompasses statutes and regulations, but not the United States
Constitution.
The implication that the court found in League of Women Voters is
contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath."s In Wong Yang Sung the Court addressed the issue of whether
administrative hearings in deportation cases had to conform with the formal
adjudication requirements of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of
1946.126 In reaching the conclusion that these hearings had to conform with
formal adjudication requirements, the Court interpreted provisions in section
5 of the APA that made the Act's formal adjudication requirements applicable

123. Ogbum-Matthews v. Loblolly Partners, 332 S.C. 551,570-71,505 S.E.2d 598,607-08
(1998); see also Stono River Envtl. Protection Ass'n v. South Carolina Dep't of Health &Envtl.
Control, 305 S.C. 90, 94,406 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1991) ("In our view, constitutional due process
provisions, apart from the APA, are sufficient to confer the rights to notice and for an
opportunity to be heard.").
124. Ogburn-Matthews,332 S.C. at 571, 505 S.E.2d at 608.
125. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
126. Id. at 35; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994)).
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to "adjudication[s] required by statute." '27 In the original bill, section 5 applied
to "hearings required by law."' 28 The government accordingly argued that a
language change in the Act demonstrated that section 5 ofthe Act was intended
to apply only "when explicit statutory words granting a right to adjudication
can be pointed out."'2 9 Because there was no statute requiring deportation
hearings, the government argued that those hearings did not have to comply
with the Federal APA, even if the hearings were required by due process. 30
That argument, similar to the one made by Ogbum-Matthews, posed the same
question: Can a due process hearing requirement trigger the formal
adjudication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act?
The Court in Wong YangSungheld that due process did trigger the APA.' 3 '
The Court reasoned that "[t]he constitutional requirement of procedural due
process of law derives from the same source as Congress' power to legislate
2
and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that body.'1
Further, the Court explained: "We would hardly attribute to Congress a
purpose to be less scrupulous about the fairness of ahearing necessitatedby the
Constitution than one granted by it as a matter of expediency."'3 In essence,
the Court found that to hold hearings required by the Constitution lower in
status than those created by Congress's legislative power, when that power
itself is derived from the Constitution, would be absurd.'

Accordingly, the

Court held that hearings compelled by the Constitution trigger the formal
adjudication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 3 '
Although the outcome in Wong Yang Sung has been superseded by
statute, 36 the Court's analysis regarding deportation hearings compelled by the
127. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 48.
128. Id. at 49.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 48.
131. Id. at50.
132. Id. at 49
133. Id. at 50.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 50-51.
136. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1994). Section 1252(a)(2)(A) limits jurisdiction of
deportation hearings as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have
jurisdiction to review(i) except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, any
individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim
arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an
order of removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1) of this title,
(ii) except as provided in subsection (e)of this section, a
decision by the Attorney General to invoke the provisions of
such section,
(iii) the application of such section to individual aliens,
including the determination made under section 1225(b)(1)(B)
of this title, or
(iv) except as provided in subsection (e) of this section,
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Constitution has not been directly overruled. It appears that this analysis could
apply to the contested-case provision in the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act." 7 The language in the Federal APA and South Carolina's APA
regarding formal adjudications is similar. The federal provisions make the
formal adjudication requirements applicable "in every case of adjudication
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing .... Compare this to the South Carolina provisions that
explicitly refer to actions or proceedings required by law to be determined by
an agency after an opportunity for a hearing is afforded.'39 In Wong Yang Sung
the contention was that hearings were only required if expressly stipulated by
statute, not by law. The Court, however, held that the formal adjudication
provisions of the Federal APA are triggered whenever an adjudicatory hearing
is required either by statute or the Constitution. 40 The same holding would
seem to follow a fortiori under the South Carolina APA, given its broader
references to cases in which the opportunity for a hearing is required, not by
"statute," but by "any law." It could be argued that a hearing required by law
is one which is mandated by state and federal constitutional due process
standards, thereby triggering the contested-case provision of the South Carolina
APA.
On the other hand, Mathews v. Eldridgedismantles this theory somewhat.
The fundamental premise of the Eldridgetest is that not all agency decisions
require a trial-type hearing to satisfy due process of law. "'Whether a particular

procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to
implement the provisions of section 1225(b)(1) of this title.
137. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(3) (West Supp. 1999).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
139. The South Carolina APA definition provides that a "'[e]ontested case' means a
proceeding including, but not restricted to, ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing, in which the
legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are requiredby law to be determined by an agency
afteran opportunityfor hearing" S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(3) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis
added).
The comparable language in the federal APA reads:
This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in
every case ofadjudicationrequiredby statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to
the extent that there is involved(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts
de novo in a court;
(2) the selection or tenure of an employee, except a [sic]
administrative lawjudge appointed under section 3105 ofthistitle;
(3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections,
tests, or elections;
(4) the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions;
(5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a court; or
(6) the certification of worker representatives.
5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
140. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 50-51.
141. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,348-49 (1976).
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action requires such additional procedures is a function of the three factors set
forth in the test.' 42 In essence, even when federal or state constitutional
provisions mandate that the individual be afforded an opportunity to be heard,
an opportunity required by law, this due process requirement may not
necessitate a trial-type hearing. However, even if Eldridgeundermines Wong
Yang Sung's interpretation of the Federal APA, it does not foreclose
interpreting the more broadly worded South Carolina APA.
VI. CONCLUSION

"Few subjects have generated more inclusive principles of law than attend
the question of when a trial-type hearing is required as a condition of
administrative action."'4 Ogburn-Matthewsclearly leaves this question open
for debate. The underlying principles of the case are inconclusive. On one
hand, the court flatly rejects that a trial-type hearing is mandated to satisfy due
process, while on the other hand the court intimates that where certain types of
private interests are involved, formal adjudication may be required as a
condition of due process. What the case does suggest is that determining what
procedural safeguards are necessary to satisfy due process is a factual issue and
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. The analysis involves a balancing
of the private interest at stake against the governmental interest involved."
Understandably, the cost of conducting formal hearings in every challenged
certification may be overly burdensome to the Agency; however, in order to
protect the private interest involved in these cases, some lesser measure could
be implemented. At the very least, the balancing of these interests would
support an affirmative response by the Agency. Such a response can assure
parties on both sides of the issue that a rational result, factually supported, is
reached.
PamelaA. Baker

142. Id. at 334-35.
143. Robert H. Stoloff, The Right To A Hearing: Statutory Rights, ConstitutionalRights
And 'FundamentalFairness,'NEWJERsEY LAW., Oct./Nov. 1996, at 14 (quoting Justice Daniel
J. O'Hern).
144. See id. at 38. ("[F]or those situations falling outside any well-settled area, the right to
a trial-type hearing must be determined based on a review of the nature of the rights involved,
the existence of disputed adjudicative facts and the type of hearing necessary to ensure fair
process and avoid arbitrary state action.").
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